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Abstract
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper introduces a new solution by
allocating, to any player, the items (taken from an universe) that are attainable for the
player, but can not be blocked (by any coalition not containing the player). The resulting
value turns out to be an utmost important concept for set games to characterize the
family of set game solutions that possess a so-called potential representation (similar
to the potential approaches applied in both physics and cooperative game theory). An
axiomatization of the new value, called Driessen{Sun value, is given by three properties,
namely one type of an eciency property, the substitution property and one type of a
monotonocity property.
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1 Introduction
In physics the potential is a highly important concept, for instance a vector eld u is said
to be conservative if there exists a continuously dierentiable function U called potential the
gradient of which agrees with the vector eld (notation: 5U = u). There exist several char-
acterizations of conservative vector elds (e.g., 5jui = 5iuj , or every contour integral with
respect to the vector eld u is zero). Surprisingly, the successful treatment of the potential in
physics turned out to be reproducible, in the late eighties and the nineties, in the mathemat-
ical eld called cooperative game theory. Informally, a solution concept  on the universal
cooperative game space CG is said to possess a potential representation if it is the discrete
gradient (with reference to the subtraction) of a real-valued function P on CG called potential
(notation: 5P =  ). In other words, if possible, each component of the cooperative game
solution (or each player’s payo) may be interpreted as the incremental return, determined
by the dierence of the potential function evaluation at the given cooperative game and one
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of its subgames in which the relevant player is not included. In their innovative paper, Hart
and Mas-Colell (cf. [7]) showed that the well-known cooperative game solution called Shap-
ley value is the unique solution that has a potential representation and satises the standard
eciency principle as well. The role of the Shapley value has been strengthened later on by a
second fundamental result concerning the family of cooperative game solutions that possess
a potential representation. This fundamental equivalence theorem (cf. [4]) states that every
cooperative game solution with a potential representation is equivalent to the Shapley value
in that the solution of the initial cooperative game coincides with the Shapley value of an
auxiliary cooperative game.
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a new solution concept for set games (see
Section 2) that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value for cooperative games
whenever the potential approach to the solution theory is applied to the space of set games
instead of the space of cooperative games. In the yet undeveloped mathematical eld called
set game theory, a solution concept  on the universal set game space G is said to possess a
potential representation if it is the discrete gradient (with reference to the set dierence) of a
set-valued function P on G called potential (notation: 5P =  ). The fundamental equivalence
Theorem 3.1 states that every set game solution with a potential representation is equivalent
to the so-called Driessen{Sun DS{value in that the solution of the initial set game contains
the DS{value of an auxiliary set game (such that, under certain circumstances, the inclusion
reduces to an equality). In the introductory part of Section 2 about the mathematical eld
of set games and its solution theory, the DS{value is simply introduced by allocating, to any
player, the items (taken from an universe) that are attainable for the player, but can not be
blocked by any coalition not containing the player (see Denition 2.1). Based on its explicit
descriptions (2.1){(2.3), we present, at the end of Section 2, a rst axiomatization of the
DS{value in terms of its potential representation (with respect to disjoint unions) together
with some type of eciency property (see Theorem 2.8). Section 4 is devoted to a second
axiomatization of the DS{value, the three axioms of which are presented in terms of the
relevant eciency property, the classical substitution property as well as one particular type of
a monotonocity property with reference to contributions (see Theorem 4.3). Section 3 treats,
besides the fundamental equivalence Theorem 3.1, the relationship between the existence of
the potential representation for a solution and the law of preservation of (disjoint) unions.
In the context of this law, the balanced unions property (3.4) for a set game solution  may
be interpreted as the discrete version 5j i = 5i j of the characterization 5jui = 5iuj of a
conservative vector eld u in physics. Roughly speaking, the balanced unions property (3.4)
is necessary and sucient for a set game solution to possess a potential representation (see
Theorem 3.6).
Let us briefly summarize the basic concepts from cooperative game theory. A cooperative
game with transferable utility (TU) is a pair hN; vi, where N is a nonempty, nite set and
v : 2N ! R is a characteristic function, dened on the power set of N , satisfying v(;) := 0.
Let CG denote the set of all cooperative TU-games with an arbitrary player set. An element
of N (notation: i 2 N) and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S  N or S 2 2N
with S 6= ;) is called a player and coalition respectively, and the associated real number
v(S) is called the worth of coalition S, to be interpreted as the earnings (in the utility of
money) its members can attain by mutual cooperation among themselves. Concerning the
solution theory for cooperative TU-games, a single-valued solution  on CG (or on a particular
subclass of CG) associates a single payo vector  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 RN with every
TU-game hN; vi 2 CG. The payo  i(N; v) to player i in the game hN; vi represents an
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assessment by i of his gains from participating in the game. The well-known Shapley value
Sh(N; v) = (Shi(N; v))i2N 2 RN of the TU-game hN; vi is given by (cf. [12], [11])
Shi(N; v) =
X
SN;
S3i
(jSj − 1)!  (jN j − jSj)!
jN j! 

v(S)− v(Snfig)

for all i 2 N , (1.1)
where jSj denotes the size (cardinality) of coalition S. For a detailed introduction about
cooperative game theory, we refer to [5] or [6].
2 The Driessen{Sun value for set games
Let U , called the universe, denote an abstract set which is xed throughout the remainder.
Following the introductory papers [1] (chapter 7), [2], [3], [8], a set game is a pair hN; vi,
where N is a nonempty, nite set, called player set, and v : 2N ! 2U is acharacteristic
mapping, dened on the power set of N , satisfying v(;) := ;. Let G denote the space of all
set games with an arbitrary player set, whereas GN denotes the space of all set games with
reference to a player set N which is xed beforehand. An element of N (notation: i 2 N)
and a nonempty subset S of N (notation: S  N or S 2 2N with S 6= ;) is called a player
and coalition respectively, and the associated set v(S)  U is called the worth of coalition S,
to be interpreted as the (sub)set of items from U that can be obtained (are needed, preferred,
owned) by coalition S if its members cooperate. Given a set game hN; vi and a coalition S,
we write hS; vSi for the sub set game obtained by restricting v to subsets of S only (i.e., to
2S).
Concerning the solution theory for set games, a solution  on G (or on a particular subclass
of G) associates a so-called allocation  (N; v) = ( i(N; v))i2N 2 (2U )N with every set game
hN; vi. The so-called allocation  i(N; v)  U to player i in the set game hN; vi represents the
items that are given, according to the solution  , to player i from participating in the game.
Until further notice, no constraints are imposed upon a solution  on G. The dierence of
two sets A; B  U is denoted by A−B and dened to be A−B := fx 2 A j x 62 Bg.
Denition 2.1. The Driessen{Sun value on the set game space G associates with every set
game hN; vi the allocation DS(N; v) = (DSi(N; v))i2N 2 (2U )N , where its allocation to any
player is given by
DSi(N; v) :=
 [
SN;
S3i
v(S)

−
 [
TNnfig
v(T )

or equivalently, (2.1)
=

[SN v(S)

−

[TNnfig v(T )

or equivalently, (2.2)
= [SN;
S3i

v(S)−

[TNnfig v(T )

for all i 2 N . (2.3)
By (2.1), the DS{value of player i in a set game is fully determined by those items that are
attainable by player i (through a certain coalition containing i), but can not be blocked (by
any coalition not containing i). In this context we say a coalition T  N can not block an
item x 2 U whenever the item does not belong to the coalition’s worth, that is x 62 v(T ).
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Remark 2.2. The Driessen{Sun value is one member out of the family of set games solutions
of the following form:
 i(N; v) = [SN;
S3i

v(S) −5vS;i

for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N , (2.4)
where, for every coalition S and every player i, the expression 5vS;i depends, to some weak or
strong extent, upon the worths of a certain collection of coalitions, somehow determined by S
and/or i. By (2.3), the DS{value arises from (2.4) by choosing 5vS;i := [TNnfigv(T ) for all
i 2 N , with reference to worths of all the coalitions not containing player i. The marginalistic
value MARG, as introduced by [1], arises from (2.4) by choosing 5vS;i := v(Snfig) with
reference to the worth of a unique coalition. For the class of monotonic set games (i.e.,
v(S)  v(T ) for all S  T  N), it was shown in [1] that the marginalistic value coincides
with the solution of the form (2.4) by choosing 5vS;i := [j2Sv(Snfjg) with reference to the
worths of all the subcoalitions of S with one player less. Or alternatively, for monotonic
set games, the marginalistic value coincides with the solution of the form (2.4) by choosing
5vS;i := [T$Sv(T ) with reference to the worths of all the strict subcoalitions of S (cf. [13]).
According to the next lemma, the DS{value diers from these latter solutions in that another
type of eciency applies.
Denition 2.3. Let  be a solution on the set game space G.
(i) We say the solution  satises the global eciency principle if the solution allocates all
the attainable items to the players, that is
[i2N i(N; v) = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G. (2.5)
(ii) We say the solution  satises the restricted global eciency principle if
[i2N i(N; v) =

[SN v(S)

−

\i2N [TNnfigv(T )

for all hN; vi 2 G.(2.6)
In words, a restricted globally ecient solution allocates those items that are attainable
(by some player through a certain coalition containing that player), but can not be
blocked by any coalition not containing a certain player (the existence of which is
guaranteed).
Lemma 2.4. The DS{value on G satises the restricted global eciency principle.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.
Let hN; vi 2 G. For notation’ sake, write 5vNnfig := [TNnfigv(T ). By (2.2), the DS{value of
any player i is given by DSi(N; v) = [SN

v(S)−5vNnfig

. From this we derive the following
[i2NDSi(N; v) (2:2)= [i2N [SN

v(S)−5vNnfig

= [SN [i2N

v(S)−5vNnfig

= [SN

v(S)− \i2N5vNnfig

=

[SN v(S)

−

\i2N 5vNnfig

:
This completes the proof of the restricted global eciency property for the DS{value. 2
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Example 2.5. Analogous to the treatment of the bankruptcy situation in the eld of coop-
erative game theory, let us introduce its set game counterpart. With the given claim sets
Di  U , i 2 N , of the creditors, and the estate set E  U of the bankrupt rm, there is
associated the bankruptcy set game hN; vi dened to be v(S) :=

[j2SDj

\E for all S  N ,
S 6= ;. In words, the worth of coalition S consists of those items that are claimed by at least
one member of S, provided the item belongs to the estate set. Obviously, the bankruptcy set
game hN; vi is a monotonic game such that v(S) = v(Snfig) [ v(fig) for all S  N and all
i 2 S. Consequently, the marginalistic value MARG, as introduced by [1], is determined as
follows:
MARGi(N; v) := [SN;
S3i

v(S)− v(Snfig)

= v(fig) = Di \E for all i 2 N .
In words, the marginalistic value allocates, to any creditor, his claim set in such a way
that jointly claimed items have to be shared by various creditors. Due to the monotonicity
of the bankruptcy set game, the DS{value simpies to DSi(N; v) = v(N) − v(Nnfig) =
Di−[j2NnfigDj

\E for all i 2 N . In words, the DS{value allocates, to any creditor, those
items that are solely claimed by the creditor (in that jointly claimed items are not shared).
>From the development of the forthcoming theory, we conclude the Driessen{Sun value is a
highly important concept for set games to characterize the family of set game solutions that
possess a so-called potential representation (analogous to the potential approaches applied in
both physics and cooperative game theory).
Denition 2.6. Let  be a solution on the set game space G.
(i) We say the solution  admits a potential 1 if there exists a set-valued function P : G !
2U satisfying P (;; v;) := ; and
P (N; v) =  i(N; v) [ P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N . (2.7)
We say the solution  admits a potential P with disjoint unions if (2.7) refers to a
disjoint union, i.e.,  i(N; v) \ P (Nnfig; vNnfig) = ; for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N .
(ii) The mapping F : G ! G associates with every set game hN; vi 2 G its solution set
game hN;F v i 2 G dened to be F v (;) := ; and
F v (S) := [j2S j(S; vS) for all S  N , S 6= ;. (2.8)
By (2.7), the set-valued potential function P is supposed to be monotonic (with respect
to inclusion of sets, i.e., player sets of subgames). Assuming the monotonicity of P , (2.7)
reduces to the following equality:
P (N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig) =  i(N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all hN; vi 2 G, all i 2 N .
1A single-valued cooperative game solution  is said to admit a potential if there exists a real-valued function
P : CG ! R satisfying P (;; v;) := 0 and  i(N; v) = P (N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all hN; vi 2 CG and
all i 2 N (cf. [7], [4], [10]).
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In words, for any set game, the complementary part of two subsequent set-valued potential
evaluations agrees with the part of the solution which is not yet covered by the smallest
potential evaluation. Next, we claim the Driessen{Sun value admits a very natural potential,
composed of the union of the worth of all the coalitions in a set game. In fact, we establish
that the DS{value is fully determined by its potential representation (with disjoint unions),
together with the restricted global eciency property.
Proposition 2.7. The DS{value admits a set-valued potential function PDS : G ! 2U , with
disjoint unions, given by
PDS(N; v) = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G. (2.9)
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Let hN; vi 2 G and i 2 N . With the help of (2.9), we verify the
potential representation (2.7) as follows:
DSi(N; v) [ PDS(Nnfig; vNnfig) (2:1)=

[SN;
S3i
v(S)

−

[TNnfig v(T )

[

[SNnfig v(S)

=

[SN;
S3i
v(S)

[

[SNnfig v(S)

= [SNv(S) = PDS(N; v)
So, (2.7) holds. Particularly, in the context of the DS{value, (2.7) refers to a disjoint
union. The above proof claries that the very same potential function (2.9) is applicable for
a potential representation (but not with disjoint unions) of any solution  of the form
 i(N; v) =

[SN;
S3i
v(S)

− vi ; where vi  [TNnfigv(T ) for all i 2 N .
2
Theorem 2.8. (Characterization of the DS{value)
The DS{value on G is the unique solution  on G that satises the restricted global eciency
principle and admits a potential with disjoint unions.
Proof of the uniquenes part of Theorem 2.8.
Let  be a solution on G satisfying the restricted global eciency principle and admitting
a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U with disjoint unions. Let hN; vi 2 G. By the
potential representation (2.7) with disjoint unions, it holds
 i(N; v)
(2:7)
= P (N; v)− P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all i 2 N , and so
F v (N)
(2:8)
= [i2N i(N; v) = P (N; v)− \i2NP (Nnfig; vNnfig) or equivalently,
P (N; v) = F v (N) [ \i2NP (Nnfig; vNnfig) on the understanding that
F v (N)
(2:6)
=

[SN v(S)

−

\i2N [TNnfigv(T )

(restricted global eciency).
In words, the potential function P is uniquely determined in a recursive manner (as a matter
of fact, P is given by (2.9)) and since (2.7) refers to a disjoint union, the value  is uniquely
determined too (and equals the DS{value). 2
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Proposition 2.9. With every set game hN; vi 2 G there is associated the monotonic cover
set game hN;wi 2 G dened to be w(S) := [RSv(R) for all S  N . Then it holds
(i) v  w, that is v(S)  w(S) for all S  N .
(ii) hN;wi is a monotonic set game, that is w(S)  w(T ) for all S  T  N .
(iii) The DS{value is invariant under the monotonic cover, that is DS(N;w) = DS(N; v).
(iv) The equality DS(N;w) = MARG(N;w) holds if and only if hN;wi is a weakly convex
set game, that is w(S) − w(Snfig)  w(N)− w(Nnfig) for all S  N and all i 2 S.
Proof of Proposition 2.9. Let hN; vi 2 G. To prove the invariance of the DS{value under
the monotonic cover, we derive from (2.2) and the monotonicity of hN;wi the following:
DSi(N; v)
(2:2)
=

[SN v(S)

−

[TNnfig v(T )

= w(N)− w(Nnfig) (2:2)= DSi(N;w)
for all i 2 N . This proves part (iii). Moreover, for all i 2 N , it holds MARGi(N;w) :=
[SN;
S3i

w(S)−w(Snfig)

 w(N)−w(Nnfig) = DSi(N;w). So, the equality MARGi(N;w) =
DSi(N;w) holds if and only if [SN;
S3i

w(S)−w(Snfig)

 w(N)−w(Nnfig) or equivalently,
w(S)− w(Snfig)  w(N) − w(Nnfig) for all S  N with i 2 S. This proves part (iv). 2
Remark 2.10. Let’ s briefly discuss the relationship of the DS{value with the concept of the
core for set games. We say the DS{value of a set game hN; vi 2 G satises all core constraints
if it holds
[i2SDSi(N; v)  [TSv(T ) for all S $ N , or equivalently,
[i2SDSi(N; v)  v(S) for all S $ N .
Notice that the core membership of the DS-value is invariant under the monotonic cover,
that is DS(N; v) satises all core constraints (with reference to the initial set game hN; vi)
if and only if DS(N;w) satises all core constraints (with respect to the monotonic cover
set game hN;wi as dened in Proposition 2.9). We claim, for monotonic set games hN; vi,
the DS{value satises all core constraints if and only if v(S) \

\i2S v(Nnfig)

= ; for all
S $ N . Indeed, for a monotonic set game hN; vi, it holds DSi(N; v) = v(N) − v(Nnfig) for
all i 2 N and so, the core constraint for the DS{value, induced by every coalition S $ N ,
reduces as follows:
[i2S

v(N)− v(Nnfig)

 v(S) or equivalently, v(S) \

\i2S v(Nnfig)

= ;
3 Characterizations of solutions that admit a potential
Above all, we treat an equivalence theorem concerning set game solutions that possess a
potential representation; the main result of which is referring to the Driessen{Sun value, as
given by (2.1). Until further notice, no eciency constraints are imposed upon a solution.
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Theorem 3.1. (Equivalence Theorem) 2 Consider the setting of Denitions 2.1 and 2.6.
(i) If a solution  on G admits a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U , then the
following holds:
P (N; v) = [SNF v (S) and DS(N;F v )   (N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G. (3.1)
In words, the solution of any set game contains the DS{value of the associated solution
set game.
(ii) If DS(N;F v )   (N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G, then the solution  admits a potential, the
set-valued function P of which is given by (3.1).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let  be a solution on the set game space G.
Suppose the solution  admits a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U . We prove
by induction on the number n of players that the unique potential function P is given by
P (N; v) = [SNF v (S) for all hN; vi 2 G.
In case n = 1, say hfig; vi, then, by (2.7), it holds P (fig; v) =  i(fig; v) [ P (;; v;) =
 i(fig; v) = F v (fig). >From now on, let hN; vi 2 G satisfy n  2. >From (2.7), that is
P (N; v) =  i(N; v)[P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all i 2 N , we derive, by taking the union over all
i 2 N , the following:
P (N; v) =

[i2N  i(N; v)

[

[i2N P (Nnfig; vNnfig)

(2:8)
= F v (N) [

[i2N

[SNnfig F v (S)

(due to the induction hypothesis)
= F v (N) [

[S$N F v (S)

= [SNF v (S):
>From the determination of the potential function P , we deduce that, for all i 2 N , it holds
P (N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig) =

[SN F v (S)

−

[TNnfig F v (T )

(2:2)
= DSi(N;F v ) (3.2)
where the latter equality is due to the alternative description (2.2) of the DS{value. So far,
we conclude that it holds
DSi(N;F v ) = P (N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig)   i(N; v) for all i 2 N ,
where the latter inclusion arises from the assumption P (N; v) =  i(N; v)[P (Nnfig; vNnfig).
This completes the proof of the statement in part (i). To prove the statement in part (ii),
suppose the inclusion DS(N;F v )   (N; v) holds. Dene the potential function P : G ! 2U
as given by (3.1). Let hN; vi 2 G. Since the very same reasoning (3.2) applies, we arrive at
P (N; v) − P (Nnfig; vNnfig) (3:2)= DSi(N;F v )   i(N; v) for all i 2 N .
2A single-valued cooperative game solution  admits a real-valued potential function P : CG ! R if and
only if the solution of any cooperative game equals the Shapley{value (see (1.1)) of the associated solution
cooperative game, that is  (N; v) = Sh(N;F v ) for all hN; vi 2 CG, where the solution game hN;F v i 2 CG is
dened to be F v (;) := 0 and F v (S) :=
P
j2S  j(S; vS) for all S  N , S 6= ; (cf. [4]).
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This implies, for all i 2 N , the inclusion P (N; v)   i(N; v) [ P (Nnfig; vNnfig) holds,
whereas the inverse inclusion holds due to the inclusions P (Nnfig; vNnfig)  P (N; v) and
 i(N; v)  [j2N j(N; v) (2:8)= F v (N)  [SNF v (S)
(3:1)
= P (N; v):
So, (2.7) holds and thus, the solution  admits a potential. This completes the full proof. 2
Remark 3.2. Two very slight changes within the proof of Theorem 3.1 establish the following
equivalence: a solution  on G admits a potential function P with disjoint unions if and
only if the equality DS(N;F v ) =  (N; v) holds for all hN; vi 2 G. Particularly, in the
setting of the DS{value, by Proposition 2.7, the equality DS(N;F vDS) = DS(N; v) holds
for all hN; vi 2 G. Without going into details, we state that a direct and computational
proof of the latter equality can be based on the following two relationships (to be proved by
induction): rstly, [SN;
S3i
F vDS(S) = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N and secondly,
[TMFwDS(T ) = [TMw(T ) for all hM;wi 2 G.
Corollary 3.3. For every globally ecient solution  (see (2.5)) it holds DS(N;F v ) =
DS(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G. Consequently, the following two statements for a globally ecient
solution  are equivalent.
(i) The solution  admits a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U .
(ii) DS(N; v)   (N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G.
In particular, the set-valued potential function, if it exists, is given by
P (N; v) = [SNv(S) for all hN; vi 2 G. (3.3)
In words, a globally ecient solution admits a set-valued potential function if and only if the
solution contains the DS{value (which is not globally ecient by Lemma 2.4). Moreover,
the associated set-valued potential function, if it exists, does not depend upon the particular
choice of any globally ecient solution. For instance, the marginalistic value MARG, as
mentioned in Remark 2.2, admits a potential by Corollary 3.3(ii) since the trivial inclusion
DS(N; v) MARG(N; v) holds for all hN; vi 2 G.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Let  be a globally ecient solution on the set game space G and
hN; vi 2 G. By its globally eciency, it holds [j2S j(S; vS) = [RSvS(R) or equivalently,
F v (S) = [RSv(R) for all S  N , S 6= ;. From the alternative description (2.2) of the
DS{value, we derive, for all i 2 N , the following:
DSi(N;F v )
(2:2)
=

[SN F v (S)

−

[TNnfig F v (T )

=

[SN [RSv(R)

−

[TNnfig [RT v(R)

=

[SN v(S)

−

[TNnfig v(T )

(2:2)
= DSi(N; v) whereas
P (N; v)
(3:1)
= [SNF v (S) = [SN [RS v(R) = [SNv(S)
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This proves the statement DS(N;F v ) = DS(N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G as well as (3.3). 2
The remainder of this section is devoted to a property for a solution, which turns out to be
sucient to guarantee the potential representation of the solution.
Denition 3.4. We say a solution  on the set game space G satises the balanced unions
property 3 if, for any pair of players, the union of their allocated items is independent of their
order to form the grand coalition in the nal stage, i.e., for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N ,
j 2 N , i 6= j, it holds
 i(N; v) [  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) =  j(N; v) [  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg) (3.4)
In other words, we say  preserves unions (in physics notation: 5j i = 5i j for all i; j 2 N ,
i 6= j). Moreover, we say the solution  satises the balanced unions property with disjoint
unions (or equivalently, preserves disjoint unions) if (3.4) refers to a disjoint union, i.e.,
 i(N; v) \  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) = ; for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j.
Lemma 3.5. The DS{value on G preserves disjoint unions, i.e., satises the balanced unions
property (3.4) with disjoint unions.
Proof of Lemma 3.5.
Let hN; vi 2 G and i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j. In order to verify (3.4), we derive from (2.1) the
following chain of equalities:
DSi(N; v) [DSj(Nnfig; vNnfig)
(2:1)
=

[SN;
S3i
v(S)

−

[TNnfig v(T )

[

[TNnfig;
T3j
v(T )

−

[RNnfi;jg v(R)

=

[ SN;
S3i; S3j
v(S)

[

[SNnfjg;
S3i
v(S)

[

[TNnfig;
T3j
v(T )

−

[RNnfi;jg v(R)

In words, the latter expression is symmetric in the interchangeable roles of the two players i
and j. So, (3.4) holds and thus, the DS{value preserves unions. Notice that (3.4) refers to a
disjoint union since [TNnfig;
T3j
v(T )  [TNnfigv(T ). 2
Theorem 3.6. Let  be a solution on the set game space G. 4
(i) If  satises the balanced unions property (3.4), then  admits a set-valued potential
function P : G ! 2U .
(ii) If  admits a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U with disjoint unions, then  
satises the balanced unions property (3.4) with disjoint unions.
3A single-valued cooperative game solution  on CG is said to satisfy the balanced contributions property
(or to preserve discrete dierences) if it holds  i(N; v) −  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg) =  j(N; v) −  j(Nnfig; vNnfig)
for all hN; vi 2 CG and all i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j (cf. [9])
4A single-valued cooperative game solution  on CG admits a real-valued potential function P : CG ! R
if and only if  preserves discrete dierences, that is  satises the balanced contributions property ([9], [4]).
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Proof of Theorem 3.6.
Suppose the solution  satises the balanced unions property (3.4), that is  preserves unions.
Dene the potential function P : G ! 2U recursively by
P (N; v) :=  i(N; v) [ P (Nnfig; vNnfig) for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N .
We show, by induction on the number n of players, that the potential function P is well-
dened. In case n = 1, say hfig; vi, then, by denition, P (fig; v) =  i(fig; v) [ P (;; v;) =
 i(fig; v). From now on, let hN; vi 2 G satisfy n  2 and i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j. By applying
the induction hypothesis twice, to P (Nnfig; vNnfig) as well as P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg), together
with the assumption (3.4), we obtain the following chain of equalities:
 i(N; v) [ P (Nnfig; vNnfig) (IH)=  i(N; v) [

 j(Nnfig; vNnfig) [ P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)

(3:4)
=  j(N; v) [

 i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg) [ P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)

(IH)
=  j(N; v) [ P (Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
So, the potential function P is well-dened, provided (3.4) holds. This proves the implication
mentioned in part (i). In order to prove the implication mentioned in part (ii), suppose  
admits a set-valued potential function P : G ! 2U with disjoint unions. Let hN; vi 2 G and
i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j. By the potential representation (2.7), it holds  i(N; v) = P (N; v) −
P (Nnfig; vNnfig) as well as  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) = P (Nnfig; vNnfig)− P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg),
where P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg)  P (Nnfig; vNnfig)  P (N; v). Now it follows immediately
that  i(N; v) [  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) = P (N; v) − P (Nnfi; jg; vNnfi;jg). We conlude that the
expression  i(N; v) [  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) is symmetric in the interchangeable roles of the two
players i and j, such that it concerns a disjoint union. This proves the implication mentioned
in part (ii). 2
Example 3.7. Let the solution  on the set game space G be given by
 i(N; v) := [SN;
S3i
CvS for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N , (3.5)
on the understanding that, for every S  N , S 6= ;, the so-called contribution CvS only
depends upon the coalition S and not upon any player i 2 S (e.g., CvS := v(S)−[T$Sv(T )).
Write Cv; := ;. A solution  of the form (3.5) satises the following properties:
(i) The solution  preserves balanced unions, that is (3.4) holds.
(ii) F v (S) = [RSCvR for all S  N and DS(N;F v )   (N; v) for all hN; vi 2 G.
(iii) The potential function P : G ! 2U satises P (N; v) = [SNCvS for all hN; vi 2 G.
Proof of Example 3.7.
Let hN; vi 2 G and i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j. Then it holds
 i(N; v) [  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) =

[ SN;
S3i; S3j
CvS

[

[SNnfjg;
S3i
CvS

[

[SNnfig;
S3j
CvS

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Since the latter expression at the right hand side is symmetric with respect to the interchange-
able roles of the two players i and j, the solution  preserves balanced unions. Furthermore,
for all S  N , S 6= ;, it holds
F v (S)
(2:8)
= [j2S j(S; vS) = [j2S [RS;
R3j
CvR = [RSCvR and thus,
DSi(N;F v )
(2:2)
=

[SN F v (S)

−

[TNnfig F v (T )

=

[SN [RSCvR

−

[TNnfig [RTCvR

=

[SN CvS

−

[TNnfig CvT

 [SN;
S3i
CvS
(3:5)
=  i(N; v)
By Theorem 3.1(ii), the solution  admits a potential, the set-valued potential function
P : G ! 2U of which is given by P (N; v) (3:1)= [SNF v (S) = [SN [RS CvR = [SNCvS .
This completes the full proof. 2
Theorem 3.8. Let  be a solution on the set game space G. 5
(i) If  satises the balanced unions property (3.4), then  satises the next recursive
formula: for all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N , it holds
 i(N; v) [ F v (Nnfig) = F v (N) [

[j2Nnfig  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

(3.6)
(ii) If  satises the balanced unions property (3.4) with disjoint unions, then  satises
the recursive formula (3.6) with disjoint unions, that is  i(N; v) \ F v (Nnfig) = ; for
all hN; vi 2 G and all i 2 N .
Proof of Theorem 3.8.
First suppose (3.4) holds, that is the solution  preserves unions. Fix the set game hN; vi 2 G
as well as i 2 N . By (3.4), we derive, by taking the union over all j 2 Nnfig, the following:
 i(N; v) [

[j2Nnfig  j(Nnfig; vNnfig)

=

[j2Nnfig  j(N; v)

[

[j2Nnfig  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

By adding  i(N; v) to both sides of the latter equality and recalling (2.8) concerning the
solution game, we arrive at the following equality:
 i(N; v) [ F v (Nnfig) = F v (N) [

[j2Nnfig  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)

5A single-valued cooperative game solution  on CG admits a real-valued potential function P : CG ! R
i  satises the next recursive formula: jN j   i(N; v) = F v (N) − F v (Nnfig) +
P
j2Nnfig  i(Nnfjg; vNnfjg)
for all hN; vi 2 CG and all i 2 N (cf. [4]).
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So, the recursive formula (3.6) holds. This proves the implication mentioned in part (i). The
implication mentioned in part (ii) follows immediately by the observation that, for all hN; vi 2
G and all i 2 N , it holds  i(N; v)\F v (Nnfig) =  i(N; v)\

[j2Nnfig j(Nnfig; vNnfig)

= ;
whenever  i(N; v) \  j(Nnfig; vNnfig) = ; for all j 2 Nnfig. 2
4 An axiomatization of the DS{value for set games
The purpose of this section is to present an axiomatic characterization of the DS{value. To
be exact, we show that the DS{value is fully determined by the restricted global eciency,
as treated in Section 2, and the so-called substitution property together with a type of mono-
tonicity property. The proof technique is based on the decomposition of any set game into a
union of a new type of set games, called simple set games. Concerning simple set games, the
worth of any coalition equals either the empty set or a singleton consisting of one arbitrary,
but xed item.
Denition 4.1. Let  be a solution on the set game space G. We say the solution  possesses
(i) the substitution property if  i(N; v) =  j(N; v) for any pair i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, of
substitutes in the set game hN; vi 2 G (i.e., v(S[fig) = v(S[fjg) for all S  Nnfi; jg).
In words, two substitutes in a set game are allocated the same items.
(ii) the contributions monotonicity property 6 if
 i(N; v)   i(N;w) for all hN; vi 2 G, hN;wi 2 G, and all i 2 N , (4.1)
satisfying CvS;i  CwS;i for all S  N with i 2 S, where the contribution is given by
CvS;i := v(S) − [TNnfigv(T ). In words, with respect to two dierent set games, the
larger the player’s contributions in the game, the more items allocated to the player.
(iii) the null player property if  i(N; v) = ; for every null player i in the set game hN; vi 2 G
(i.e., v(S [ fig) = v(S) for all S  Nnfig). In words, a null player receives no items.
(iv) the destructive player property if  i(N; v) = ; for every destructive player i in the set
game hN; vi 2 G (i.e., v(S) = ; for all S  N with i 2 S). In words, a destructive
player receives no items.
Lemma 4.2. The DS{value on G satises the substitution, contributions monotonicity, null
player and destructive player properties.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.
Let hN; vi 2 G. In order to prove the substitution property for the DS{value, let the pair
6A single-valued cooperative game solution  on CG is said to satisfy the strong monotonicity property if
it holds  i(N; v)   i(N;w) for all hN; vi 2 CG, hN;wi 2 CG, and all i 2 N , satisfying v(S) − v(Snfig) 
w(S) − w(Snfig) for all S  N with i 2 S. The Shapley value Sh, as given by (1.1), possesses this property
and in fact, is fully characterized by the strong monotonicity, together with the eciency property (cf. [16]).
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i 2 N , j 2 N , i 6= j, be substitutes in hN; vi. By (2.2), the DS{value of player i is given by
DSi(N; v)
(2:2)
=

[SN v(S)

−

[TNnfig;
T 63j
v(T )

[

[TNnfig;
T3j
v(T )

=

[SN v(S)

−

[TNnfi;jg v(T )

[

[SNnfi;jg v(S [ fjg)

Since, by assumption, v(S [ fig) = v(S [ fjg) for all S  Nnfi; jg, it follows that the
players i and j are interchangeable in the right-hand side of the latter equality and thus,
DSi(N; v) = DSj(N; v) for any pair i; j of substitutes in the set game hN; vi. This proves the
substitution property for the DS{value. The null player property for the DS{value follows
immediately from the inclusion DSi(N; v)  [TNnfig [v(T [ fig)) − v(T )] for all i 2 N .
Clearly, by (2.1), DSi(N; v) = ; for every destructive player i in the set game hN; vi. Finally,
by (2.3), the DS{value possesses the contributions monotonicity property. This completes
the proof of all four properties for the DS{value. 2
Theorem 4.3. (Axiomatization) Consider the setting of Denitions 2.1, 2.3(ii) and 4.1.
The Driessen{Sun value on the set game space GN (with reference to a xed player set N)
is the unique solution  on GN satisfying the restricted global eciency, substitution, and
contributions monotonicity properties.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 proceeds in three steps. The rst preliminary result provides
another interpretation of the Driessen{Sun value in that the DS{value represents the maximal
solution satisfying the restricted global eciency and contributions monotonicity properties.
Proposition 4.4. If a solution  on GN satises the restricted global eciency and contri-
butions monotonicity properties, then the inclusion  i(N; v)  DSi(N; v) holds for all hN; vi
and all i 2 N .
Proof of Proposition 4.4.
Suppose a solution  on GN satises the restricted global eciency and contributions mono-
tonicity properties. Let hN; vi be a set game and i 2 N . In order to show the inclusion
 i(N; v)  DSi(N; v), let x 2  i(N; v), but assume, on the contrary, x 62 DSi(N; v). Dene
a new set game hN;wi as follows:
w(S) :=
(
v(S)− fxg for all S  N with x 2 v(S);
v(S) for all S  N with x 2 U − v(S).
Notice that x 62 w(S) for all S  N . From this observation, together with the restricted
global eciency (2.6) of  applied to the set game hN;wi, we derive the following chain of
inclusions:
 i(N;w)  [j2N j(N;w) (2:6)=

[SN w(S)

−

\k2N [TNnfkgw(T )

 [SNw(S)  U − fxg Particularly, x 62  i(N;w).
Next we claim CwS;i = C
v
S;i for all S  N with i 2 S (where CvS;i := v(S) − [TNnfigv(T )).
Consequently,  i(N;w) =  i(N; v) by the contributions monotonicity (4.1) of  , but this
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equality contradicts the facts x 2  i(N; v) and x 62  i(N;w). This contradiction completes the
proof, provided we establish the claim above-mentioned. For notation’ sake, write 5vNnfig :=
[TNnfigv(T ).
Let S  N with i 2 S. We distinguish two cases. If x 62 v(S), then w(S) = v(S) and it holds
CwS;i = w(S)−5wNnfig = v(S) −5wNnfig = v(S)−5vNnfig = CvS;i
If x 2 v(S), then w(S) = v(S) − fxg as well as x 2 5vNnfig (because of the assumption
x 62 DSi(N; v)) and thus, it holds
CwS;i = w(S)−5wNnfig =

v(S) − fxg

−5wNnfig = v(S)−5vNnfig = CvS;i
This completes the proof of the remaining claim. Further, this proof indicates that the
restricted global eciency may be replaced by any weak form of (global) eciency, that is
[j2N j(N;w)  [SNw(S) for every set game hN;wi. In addition, the denition of the
expression 5wNnfig does not matter so much. 2
The nal part of the preliminary results (for the sake of the proof of Theorem 4.3) deals
with a particular type of set games, called simple set games, which will be treated as the
components of a decomposition for any arbitrary set game.
Denition 4.5. With every set game hN; vi 2 G and every x 2 U , there is associated the
simple set game hN; vxi 2 G dened to be
vx(S) :=
( fxg for all S  N with x 2 v(S);
; for all S  N with x 2 U − v(S).
(4.2)
The coalition S  N is said to be winning in the simple set game hN; vxi if vx(S) = fxg or
equivalently, x 2 v(S).
Proposition 4.6. (Decomposition results for set games and the DS{value)
Let hN; vi be a set game, x 2 U , and S  N . Recall CvS;i := v(S) − [TNnfigv(T ) for all
i 2 N .
(i) Let i 2 N . The following equivalence holds: CvxS;i = fxg () x 2 CvS;i (4.3)
(ii) v = [y2Uvy that is, v(T ) = [y2Uvy(T ) for all T  N . (4.4)
(iii) DSi(N; v) = [y2UDSi(N; vy) for all i 2 N . (4.5)
(iv) If a solution  on GN possesses the contributions monotonicity property, then it holds
 i(N; vx)   i(N; v) for all i 2 N and all x 2 U .
Proof of Proposition 4.6.
The decomposition statement (4.4) of the set game hN; vi is trivial since U = v(T )[

U−v(T )

for all T  N . The decomposition statement (4.5) of the DS{value of the set game hN; vi is
a direct consequence of the equivalence (4.3) because, for all i 2 N , it holds
[y2UDSi(N; vy) (2:3)= [y2U [SN;
S3i
C
vy
S;i = [SN;
S3i
[y2U CvyS;i
(4:3)
= [SN;
S3i
CvS;i
(2:3)
= DSi(N; v):
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The statement in part (iv) is a direct consequence of the equivalence (4.3) too due to the
inclusion CvxS;i  CvS;i for all S  N with i 2 S, and all x 2 U . It remains to prove, for every
i 2 N , the equivalence (4.3) as follows.
CvxS;i = fxg () vx(S)− [TNnfigvx(T ) = fxg
() vx(S) = fxg and [TNnfig vx(T ) = ;
() vx(S) = fxg and vx(T ) = ; for all T  Nnfig
() x 2 v(S) and x 62 v(T ) for all T  Nnfig
() x 2 v(S)− [TNnfigv(T )
() x 2 CvS;i
2
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 4.3.
Suppose a solution  on GN satises the restricted global eciency (RGEF), substitution
(SUBS), and contributions monotonicity (CMON) properties. Let hN; vi be a set game and
i 2 N . We show  i(N; v) = DSi(N; v). By Propositions 4.4 and 4.6 (iii)-(iv), we obtain the
following relationships:
DSi(N; v) = [y2UDSi(N; vy) as well as [y2U  i(N; vy)   i(N; v)  DSi(N; v)
Fixing the set game hN; vi, player i and item x 2 U at beforehand, it suces to show
DSi(N; vx) =  i(N; vx) for every simple set game hN; vxi. (4.6)
The proof of (4.6) proceeds by induction on the number of winning coalitions in the set game
hN;Cvxi i, dened to be Cvxi (S) := CvxS;i for all S  N . Coalition S is said to be winning
in the set game hN;Cvxi i if it holds Cvxi (S) = fxg or equivalently, x 2 CvS;i (see (4.3)). We
distinguish two cases, whether or not there exists a unique winning coalition.
Case one. Suppose there exists a unique winning coalition S1 in the set game hN;Cvxi i, that
is Cvxi (S1) = fxg and Cvxi (S) = ; for all S 6= S1.
By the equivalence (4.3), x 2 CvS1;i := v(S1)− [TNnfigv(T ). Particularly, x 2 v(S1) as well
as x 62 v(T ) for all T  Nnfig, or equivalently, by (4.2), vx(S1) = fxg and vx(T ) = ; for all
T  Nnfig. Our rst claim is the following:
 j(N; vx) = DSj(N; vx) = ; for all j 2 NnS1. (4.7)
Indeed, for all j 2 NnS1, it holds that CvxS;j := vx(S)−[TNnfjgvx(T ) = ; for all S  N (due
to S1  Nnfjg and vx(S1) = fxg). From this, together with Proposition 4.4 applied to the
simple set game hN; vxi, we deduce the following chain of inclusions:
 j(N; vx)  DSj(N; vx) (2:3)= [SN;
S3j
CvxS;j = ; for all j 2 NnS1, and so, (4.7) holds.
Our second claim is the following: C(C
vx
i )
S;i = C
vx
S;i for all S  N and thus,
 i(N;Cvxi ) =  i(N; vx) and DSi(N;C
vx
i ) = DSi(N; vx) (4.8)
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Indeed, since vx(T ) = ; for all T  Nnfig, we get Cvxi (T ) = CvxT;i = vx(T )−[RNnfigvx(R) =
; for all T  Nnfig and thus, C(C
vx
i )
S;i = C
vx
i (S) − [TNnfigCvxi (T ) = Cvxi (S) = CvxS;i for all
S  N . >From this, together with the contributions monotonicity property for both  and
the DS-value, we derive  i(N;Cvxi ) =  i(N; vx) as well as DSi(N;C
vx
i ) = DSi(N; vx). So,
(4.8) holds.
In case i 2 NnS1, then (4.7) yields  i(N; vx) = DSi(N; vx) = ; and so, (4.6) holds. It remains
to consider the case i 2 S1. In view of (4.8), we aim to prove, instead of (4.6), the equivalent
equality  i(N;Cvxi ) = DSi(N;C
vx
i ).
Firstly, note that, for all j 2 NnS1, we have Cvxi (S) = ; for all S  N with j 2 S, and thus,
by (2.3), DSj(N;Cvxi ) = ; for all j 2 NnS1. So far, from this, together with Proposition 4.4,
we conclude  j(N;Cvxi ) = DSj(N;C
vx
i ) = ; for all j 2 NnS1.
Secondly, the restricted global eciency property (2.6) for both  and the DS-value, applied
to the set game hN;Cvxi i, yields
[k2NDSk(N;Cvxi ) = [k2N k(N;Cvxi ) which equals fxg, or equivalently,
[k2S1DSk(N;Cvxi ) = [k2S1 k(N;Cvxi ) which equals fxg,
since  j(N;Cvxi ) = DSj(N;C
vx
i ) = ; for all j 2 NnS1. Note that any pair of players in S1 are
substitutes in the contributions set game hN;Cvxi i (since S1 is the unique winning coalition).
From the substitution property for both  and the DS-value, applied to the game hN;Cvxi i, we
derive  k(N;Cvxi ) =  i(N;C
vx
i ) as well as DSk(N;C
vx
i ) = DSi(N;C
vx
i ) for all k 2 S1, given
i 2 S1. In summary, the latter eciency equality simplies to  i(N;Cvxi ) = DSi(N;Cvxi ) =
fxg. >From this and (4.8), we conclude  i(N; vx) =  i(N;Cvxi ) = DSi(N;Cvxi ) = DSi(N; vx).
This completes the proof of (4.6) if there exists one winning coalition in the game hN;Cvxi i.
Case two. Suppose there are at least two winning coalitions in the set game hN;Cvxi i, say,
among others, coalition S1. Particularly, it holds Cvxi (S1) = fxg or equivalently, x 2 CvS1;i.
Dene two new set games hN; v1;ii and hN; v2;ii, arising from the contributions game hN;Cvi i
such that v1;i is almost the contributions set game Cvi and v2;i almost the empty set game.
To be exact,
v1;i(S) :=
(
CvS;i for all S 6= S1;
; for S = S1;
(4.9)
v2;i(S) :=
( ; for all S 6= S1;
CvS;i for S = S1.
(4.10)
>From the descriptions (4.9){(4.10) of both set games, together with the equivalence (4.3),
we obtain that their associated simple set games hN; (v1;i)xi and hN; (v2;i)xi are given by
(v1;i)x(S) :=
(
CvxS;i for all S 6= S1;
; for S = S1;
(4.11)
(v2;i)x(S) :=
( ; for all S 6= S1;
CvxS;i for S = S1.
(4.12)
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Note that, for all S  N , the inclusions (v1;i)x(S)  vx(S) and (v2;i)x(S)  vx(S) hold.
Concerning the contributions in both simple set games, as given by (4.11){(4.12), we claim
the following:
C
(v1;i)x
S1;i
= ; and C(v1;i)xS;i = CvxS;i for all S 6= S1; (4.13)
C
(v2;i)x
S1;i
= CvxS1;i and C
(v2;i)x
S;i = ; for all S 6= S1. (4.14)
In order to verify (4.13), for all S 6= S1, the following chain of equalities holds:
C
(v1;i)x
S;i = (v1;i)x(S)− [TNnfig(v1;i)x(T )
(4:11)
= CvxS;i − [TNnfig(v1;i)x(T )
=

vx(S)− [TNnfigvx(T )

−

[TNnfig (v1;i)x(T )

=

vx(S)− [TNnfigvx(T )

(since (v1;i)x(R)  vx(R) for all R  N)
= CvxS;i
So, (4.13) holds and similarly, (4.14) holds. Clearly, it concerns a disjoint union in that
CvxS;i = C
(v1;i)x
S;i [C
(v2;i)x
S;i for all S  N . From this we deduce the following chain of equalities:
DSi(N; vx)
(2:3)
= [SN;
S3i
CvxS;i = [SN;
S3i

C
(v1;i)x
S;i [ C
(v2;i)x
S;i

=

[SN;
S3i
C
(v1;i)x
S;i

[

[SN;
S3i
C
(v2;i)x
S;i

(2:3)
= DSi(N; (v1;i)x) [DSi(N; (v2;i)x)
By (4.14), the contributions set game hN;C(v2;i)xi i has a unique winning coalition S1, whereas
by (4.13), the collection of winning coalitions in the contributions set game hN;C(v1;i)xi i is
identical to the one in the initial contributions set game hN;Cvxi i, except for coalition S1.
The induction hypothesis (4.6) applied to both set games hN; (v1;i)xi and hN; (v2;i)xi yields
 i(N; (v1;i)x) = DSi(N; (v1;i)x) as well as  i(N; (v2;i)x) = DSi(N; (v2;i)x)
Further, from the inclusion C(v1;i)xS;i  CvxS;i for all S  N , together with the contributions
monotonicity property for  , we derive the inclusion  i(N; (v1;i)x)   i(N; vx) and similarly,
 i(N; (v2;i)x)   i(N; vx). Finally, we conclude that the following chain of inclusions holds:
DSi(N; vx) = DSi(N; (v1;i)x) [DSi(N; (v2;i)x)
=  i(N; (v1;i)x) [  i(N; (v2;i)x) (by the induction hypothesis)
  i(N; vx) (by the contributions monotonicity property of  )
 DSi(N; vx) (by Proposition 4.4).
We arrive at the equality  i(N; vx) = DSi(N; vx). This completes both the inductive proof
of (4.6) and the full proof of Theorem 4.3. 2
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